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NOTES AND COMMENTS

CIVIL PROCEDURE-NEW MEXICO'S
RECOGNITION OF THE MOTION IN LIMINE

Trial lawyers have long recognized that cases can be won by using
shrewd questions and statements to inject prejudice into the minds
of jurors.' Even if opposing counsel successfully objects to the prejudicial matter, he runs the risk that the jury, unfamiliar with the
rules of evidence, will look upon the objection as a suppression of
the facts.2 Counsel may also request that the court admonish the
jury to disregard the prejudicial questions or statements, but such
"curative" instructions are considered unrealistic and ineffective by
many commentators. 3 In recent years a procedureal device has
developed that allows counsel to avoid this dilemma in a number of
cases: the motion in limine. In general, the object of this motion is to
obtain a preliminary court order excluding references to particular
prejudicial matters at trial before such matters are actually mentioned in the presence of the jury. Last year, in the case of Proper v.
Mowry,4 the New Mexico Court of Appeals approved the use of the
motion in limine in civil cases.'
Introduction: Properv. Mowry
The case arose out of a verbal confrontation that took place at a
doctors' staff meeting. Dr. Proper sued Dr. Mowry for slander,
claiming that statements made by the latter at the meeting had
damaged his reputation in the medical community.' During a pretrial
1. A case highlighting this problem is Carabba v. Anacortes School Dist. No. 103, 72
Wash. 2d 939, 435 P.2d 936 (1967), wherein, among other things, defense counsel tried to
bring out the contents of a letter which in effect showed that plaintiff's mother had a
dubious opinion of the merits of the plaintiff's case.
2. C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 52 (2d ed. 1972).
3. J. Frank, Courts on Trial 111 (1949). For the opposite view, see State v. Valdez, 83
N.M. 632, 495 P.2d 1079 (Ct. App.), aff'd, 83 N.M. 741,497 P.2d 743 (1972).
4. 90 N.M. 710, 568 P.2d 236 (Ct. App. 1977). The New Mexico Supreme Court has not
been asked to review the decision.
5. The motion in limine can and is employed in criminal as well as civil cases. This writer
could find no reported New Mexico case explicitly approving the use of in limine procedure
in criminal cases to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence. However, discussions with local
attorneys indicate that such motions are made in New Mexico; it is believed that the
authority to hear and decide these motions is within the inherent power of the trial judge.
Statutory authority for in limine procedure also arguably exists in N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 41-23-18 (Supp. 1975), which provides for pretrial motions to suppress illegally seized
evidence, confessions, admissions, "or other evidence" that may "aggrieve" the defendant.
6. Proper v. Mowry, 90 N.M. at 712, 716, 568 P.2d at 238, 242.

NEWMEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 8

conference held more than a month before trial, defendant's
attorney made it clear that he intended to make statements in his
opening presentation to the jury which plaintiff considered prejudicial. 7 Two days before trail, plaintiff filed a motion in limine asking
the court to order the defendant to refrain from mentioning in his
opening statement that subsequent to the staff meeting quarrel
plaintiff's privileges at local hospitals were suspended for his failure
to keep charts up to date and that a charge had been filed against the
plaintiff with the grievance committee of the County Medical
Society alleging that he had charged excessive fees. The motion was
heard in the .court's chambers the morning of the trial. The court
asked the defendant to make a record of the things he intended to
bring out in his opening statement and then partially granted
plaintiff's motion.8 The court ordered the defendant not to mention
the subject of excessive fees and the grievance committee proceedings, but allowed defendant, over objection, to state generally
that plaintiff's record keeping was not up to community standards,
that plaintiff charged fees that insurance companies would not
reimburse for patients, and that plaintiff over-utilized diagnostic
procedures. When the defendant touched on the relation of the
authorized subjects to the issue of damages in his opening statement,
plaintiff moved for a mistrial. The motion was denied and the jury
9
later returned a verdict for the defendant.
One appeal one of the plaintiff's claims was that the trial court
had erred by partially denying his motion in limine. 0I Neither the
appellant nor the appellee addressed the question of whether or not
the trial court had the authority to entertain motions in limine under
the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure. After chiding the
attorneys in the case for failing to discuss the issue in their briefs,'
the court of appeals held that the trial court had the "inherent power
2
In limine
to hear and determine plaintiff's 'motion in limine'.''
of the
16(6)
Rule
by
procedure was said to be further authorized
to
court
the
permits
which
'
New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure"
disposithe
in
aid
may
as
matters
consider prior to trial "such other
tion of the action." 1 4 The court of appeals also indicated that the
7. Id. at 713, 568 P.2d at 239.
8. Id at 712, 568 P.2d at 238.
9. Id. at 713, 568 P.2d at 239.
10. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at -.
11. 90 N.M. at 713, 568 P.2d at 239.
12. Id. at 715, 568 P.2d at 241.
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(16)(6) (Repl. 1970). The rule is identical to Rule 16(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
14. 90 N.M. at 713, 568 P.2d at 239 (quoting Rule 16(6)).
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trial court's ruling on the plaintiff's motion in limine was not
improper, for an order issued in response to a motion in limine
cannot, in itself, be reversible error.1 I
Development of In Limine Procedure
The motion in limine is of such recent origin that legal dictionaries
have not yet comprehensively defined it. The most they indicate
is
that the phrase "in limine" is of Latin derivation and means "[o] n
or
at the threshold; at the very beginning; preliminarily." 1 6 The cases
and the commentators have also failed to develop a uniform definition of the motion in limine. 1' One of the broadest definitions
of
the motion is as follows: a request for an order which is made either
before trial or at trial and out of the presence of the jury to prohibit
the opposing party, his counsel, and witnesses from making any
reference before the jury to certain evidence the mere mention
of
which would be prejudicial to the moving party.1 8 The motion
has
been used by both plaintiffs and defendants and in both civil and
criminal cases. It has been used to prevent counsel from referring
to
prejudicial evidence in his voir dire examination of the jurors and
in
his opening statement.' 9 It is also widely used to prohibit counsel
from asking questions or making statements in connection with
the
offer of evidence of questionable admissibility until the admissibility
of the evidence can be determined during the course of the trial out
of the presence of the jury. 2 In the last case, it is said that
the
motion is intended to guard against the prejudicial effect of
the
questions asked or the statements made rather than the prejudicial
effect of the evidence. 2 '
The motion in limine was unknown at English common law. 2 2
Some commentators believe that the motion may be derived from
the motion to suppress used in criminal cases to exclude illegally
seized evidence. 2 3 It may also be related to the motion to strike
allegations, prejudicial or otherwise, from the pleadings.2 4 The landmark American case attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to use
a
15. Id. at 715, 568 P.2d at 341.
16. Black's Law Dictionary 896 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
17. Nor have they been able to find a uniform name for the motion.
It has been referred
to as a motion ad limine, a motion to exclude, and a motion to
limit evidence. See,
Comment, Motion In Limine, 29 Ark. L. Rev. 215, 221-22 (1975-76).
18. See Burrus v. Silhavy, 155 Ind. App. 558, 293 N.E.2d 794 (1973).
19. Mead v. Scott, 256 Iowa 1257, 130 N.W.2d 641 (1964).
20. Twyford v. Weber, 220 N.W.2d 919 (Iowa 1974).
21. Bridges v. City of Richardson, 163 Tex. 292, -_, 354 S.W.2d 366,
367 (1962).
22. Comment, Motion in Limine, supra note 17, at 220.
23. Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 311, 315 (1975); Annot., 94 A.L.R. 1087, 1090
(1964).
24. Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d, supra note 23, at 315.
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pretrial motion to exclude prejudicial matter was Bradford v.
2
Birmingham Electric Co. 5 In a suit for personal injuries allegedly
sustained by the plaintiff while a passenger on defendant's streetcar,
plaintiff filed a motion asking the court to ascertain whether the
defendant intended to offer certain testimony relating to the
personal life and character of the plaintiff and to "inform and
admonish" the defendant not to offer the evidence at trial. The
Alabama Supreme Court upheld the trial court's refusal to make the
pretrial order, saying that to sustain the motion would be violative of
all precedent and an unwarranted judicial usurpation of authority.
The court further remarked that it would not "arrogate to itself the
prerogative of requiring counsel to inform it as to what evidence he
will or will not offer in his client's behalf" or "instruct" an attorney
as to what evidence he may introduce at trial. 6
The Birmingham court's hostility toward the motion in limine was
obviously part of the court's general hostility toward pretrial protrial as2 a
cedure. The early common law tradition viewed the and
jury. 7
judge
the
before
cohesive proceeding conducted entirely
It was the function of the parties to the case to frame the conwas not 2to1
troversy and lay it before the court for decision; the judge
parties.
the
by
forward
brought
concern himself with what was
increased
the
Pretrial procedures were clearly disapproved. However,
it necesmade
has
volume and complexity of modern day litigation
and
time
the
sary to develop certain procedural devices to shorten
29
and
judgment,
Pretrial conferences, summary
expense of trial.
3
0
courts.
state
discovery have come into favor in federal and
dogtrot-the
a
at
Adoption of the motion in limine has followed-but
development of other pretrial techniques. The motion is now exand in Alaska, Arizona,
pressly recognized in federal courts,"
California, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
3
and Washington. 2
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia,
The authority in the federal courts for the use of the motion in
limine is found in Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
25. 227 Ala. 285, 149 So. 729 (1933).
26. Id. at -, 149 So. at 730.
27. Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d, supra note 23, at 314.
28. Sunderland, The Theory and Practiceof Pre-Trial Procedure, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 215
(1937).
29. Id. at 226.
30. Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d, supra note 23 at 315-16.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Fishel, 324 F. Supp. 429 (D.C.N.Y. 1971); Aley v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 211 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
32. See Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d, supra note 23, at 311, for a partial compilation of the
cases approving the motion.
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Principally, Rule 16 allows the court in its discretion to direct the
attorneys for the parties to appear before it prior to trial to consider
simplification of issues, amendments to the pleadings, admissions of
facts and documents, and limitation on the number of expert witnesses. In addition, Rule 16 has a catch-all clause that allows the
court to consider "such other matters as may aid in the disposition
of the action." 3" Aley v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.3 4
discussed the relationship of Rule 16 to the exclusion of evidence by
the use of pretrial motions. In an action for false arrest and false
imprisonment, the plaintiff moved before trial to exclude testimony
which related to prior occasions on which the plaintiff had been
observed stealing merchandise from defendant's store. The court
stated that it believed that the testimony was prejudicial and that it
was advantageous to have reviewed it outside of the hearing of the
jury. Pretrial consideration of the admissibility of the testimony also
simplified the issues of the case. The pretrial motion was therefore
found to be a proper subject for consideration under the catch-all
clause of Rule 16.' ' The courts of states that have derived their rules
of civil procedure from the federal rules have also indicated that the
state equivalent of Rule 16 empowers courts to hear pretrial motions
3
to exclude prejudicial matter. 6
State courts also frequently find the authority to entertain
motions in limine in the trial court's inherent power to admit and
exclude evidence. 3
It is the court's duty to ensure a fair and
impartial administration of justice. Therefore, the inherent power to
exclude evidence must extend to prejudicial questions and statements that could be made in the presence of the jury.3 8 Federal
criminal cases approving pretrial exclusion of prejudicial evidence do
not point to any statutory authorization for the practice. Presumably, they also find the power to decide the motions in the inherent
power of the court.3
Wallin v. Kinyon's Estate4" is a notable California case which
33. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(6).
34. 211 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
35. Id. at 503.
36. Bradbeer v. Scott, 193 Cal. App. 2d 575, 14 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1961); Wallin v. Kinyon
Estate, 164 Mont. 160, 519 P.2d 1236 (1974).
37. People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971); Baldwin v. Inter
City Contractors Serv. Inc., 156 Ind. App. 497, 297 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Burrus v. Silhavy,
155 Ind. App. 558, 293 N.W.2d 794 (1973); State v. Johnson, 183 N.W.2d 194 (Iowa
1971); Wallin v. Kinyon Estate, 164 Mont. 160, 519 P.2d 1236 (1974).
38. Burrus v. Silhavy, 155 Ind. App. 558, -, 293 N.E.2d 794, 795 (1973).
39. See United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 497
(1968); United States v. Fishel, 324 F. Supp. 429 (D.C.N.Y. 1971).
40. 164 Mont. 160, 519 P.2d 1236 (1974).
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cited both the inherent power principle and Rule 16 as bases of
authority for the motion in limine. At the beginning of a jury trial a
will proponent's motion to exclude certain prejudicial testimony was
granted. The state supreme court held that the district court had the
discretion to grant the motion. The court noted that the state equivalent of Rule 16(6) would authorize the use of the motion in the
pretrial setting, but when, as in the case before the court, the motion
was made at trial the inherent power of the court to admit or
4
exclude evidence authorized the court to hear the motion. '
In most cases, the effect of grainting a motion in limine is to add
another procedural step to the traditional manner of introducing
evidence. The order grainting a motion in limine can take two forms:
a prohibitive order in preliminary form or a prohibitive order in
absolute form. 4 2 The preliminary form of the order prohibits
counsel from offering or mentioning anticipated prejudicial evidence
in front of the jury unless the court's permission to disregard the
order is first obtained in chambers. The absolute form of the order is
a final ruling on the admissibility of the evidence and precludes
43
Most cases
counsel from later mentioning the evidence in any way.
4
favor the preliminary prohibition over the absolute prohibition.
Many authorities believe that the trial judge does not have enough of
a complete view of the case to properly rule on the admission or
exclusion of evidence before trial. Therefore, it is better for the
court's order to leave open the possibility that the excluded evidence
4
may be used if it becomes necessary and proper during trial. 1 The
only instance in which the absolute prohibition is favored is where
the court class for an evidentiary hearing on the motion and the
movant makes a "clear showing" that the matters sought to be
4
excluded from trial are prejudicial. 6
Courts are also wary of granting motions in limine that may be
519 P.2d at 1238.
41. Id. at-.,
42. Rothblatt & Leroy, The Motion in Limine in Criminal Trials: A Technique for the
PretrialExclusion of PrejudicialEvidence, 60 Ky. LJ. 611, 615 (1972).
43. Id. at 616. Rothblatt and Leroy also suggest a third form of the motion in limine, a
pretrial motion asking to have contested evidence declared admissible, should be permissible, but no clear precedent exists for this form of the motion. Id. at 617. In Rivera v.
American Export Lines, 13 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), and Volk v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 91 F. Supp. 902 (D. Minn. 1950), the proponents of evidence obtained pretrial
determinations of its admissibility, but the admission of the evidence in question was
challenged for reasons other than prejudicial impact.
44. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Inter City Contractors Serv., Inc., 156 Ind. App. 497, 297
N.E.2d 831 (1973); Twyford v. Weber, supra at note 20.
45. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 43 at 614. 616.
46. State v. Superior Court of Maricopa, 108 Ariz. 396,.-, 499 P.2d 152, 153 (1972);
Twyford v. Weber, 220 N.W.2d 919, 923 (Iowa 1974); State v. Johnson, 183 N.W.2d 194,
197 (Iowa 1971).
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worded too broadly. The motion cannot aim to prohibit the mention
of prejudicial matter in general; it must set forth with specificity the
objectionable matter and the reasons that the movant thinks it is
prejudicial. 4 " The motion has been disapproved, for example, where
it would result in choking off a party's entire defense, claim, or
theory. In Lewis v. Buena Vista Mutual Insurance Association,4 8 the
plaintiff sued the insurer on an insurance policy that covered a house
that had been destroyed by fire. The defendant filed an amendment
to its answer averring that the plaintiff and others had committed
arson. The plaintiff presented a motion in limine to prevent the
defendant from referring to arson at trial. The appellate court
reversed the sustaining of the motion because it did not believe that
the motion was specific enough. The court indicated that the motion
should not be used to cut off the defense of arson-even though it
might be a tenuous one.4" A similar result was reached in State v.
Court of County of Maricopa ' 0 In a prosecution for the murder of a
child the defendants made an oral motion in limine to prohibit the
medical examiner from testifying to any prior injuries that did not
relate to the child's immediate cause of death. A special action was
brought to vacate the order granting the motion. The appellate court
dissolved the motion because it completely eliminated proof of one
of the important theories of the prosecution's case-namely, that the
prior assaults established motive, absence of mistake or accident, and
malice.' '
The cases agree that, although it may be error, neither the denial
of nor refusal to rule on a motion in limine is, in itself, reversible
error.5 2 Appellate complaints of error must be predicated on the
actual introduction or mention of prejudicial evidence before the
jury. To preserve the error for review counsel must object at trial
when his opponent refers to the prejudicial matter.' 3
An order in the absolute form grainting a motion in limine may
contain built-in reversible error because it prohibits the offer of the
contested evidence under any circumstances-even if developments at
47. Lewis v. Buena Vista Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 183 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1971).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 108 Ariz. 396, 499 P.2d 152 (1972).
51. Id. at _
499 P.2d at 155.
52. City of Indianapolis ex rel. Dep't of Metrop. Dev. v. Heeter, 355 N.E.2d 429 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1976); Twyford v. Weber, 220 N.W.2d 919 (Iowa 1974); State v. Garret, 183
N.W.2d 652 (Iowa 1971); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331
(Tex. 1963).
53. The cases cited in note 52, supra, all support this view, but see State v. Smith, 189
Wash. 422, 65 P.2d 1075 (1937).
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s4 On the other
trial show that the evidence is actually competent.
hand, the granting of a motion in limine with a preliminary order is
not reversible error. The exclusion of the evidence at trial is the basis
for appeal. Most authorities state that to preserve the error for appeal
the party that opposed the preliminary order should offer proof of
the prohibited material again at trial. I According to the terms of
the order this action must be done outside the hearing of the jury.
The above procedure is favored because it creates a clear record for
appeal, but an exception to the requirement of a subsequent offer of
proof is recognized where the motion in limine was granted during an
evidentiary hearing and nothing occurred at trial to change the
posture of the parties in regard to the admissibility or inadmissibility
of the evidence.5 6
The authorities are divided on the question of whether it is reversible error for a party to violate an order by referring to prohibited
matters at trial without having first obtained the court's permission
to do so. s 7 Some cases hold that a violation of the exclusionary
ruling is not reversible error if the trial judge instructed the jury to
disregard the prejudicial evidence or if the movant did not object to
5
the violation of the order and ask for a curative instruction. 8 This
result seems incorrect in view of the fact that the motion in limine
was developed to obviate the necessity of objecting before the jury
and because curative instructions are thought ineffective to remove
prejudicial effects on the jury.5 9 The better reasoned cases state that
the violation of an exclusionary order-provided that the mention of
the excluded matter was in fact prejudicial-is reversible error. This is
true even if no curative instruction was asked for,' I or, according to
6
Some
one case, even if the trial judge gave the curative instruction.
when
object
to
of the cases in this last group may require the movant
could
counsel
the exclusionary order is violated but suggest that
54. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 42, at 616.
55. Twyford v. Weber, 220 N.W.2d 919, 923-24 (Iowa 1974); City of Corpus Christi v.
Nemec, 404 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966); State v. Wheeler, 390 S.W.2d 339, 344 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1965).
56. Twyford v. Weber, 220 N.W.2d 919, 924 (Iowa 1974); Gustofson v. Iowa Power &
Light Co., 183 N.W.2d 213 (Iowa 1971).
57. However, the presentation of matters excluded by the court's order through suggestion, wording of a question, or by indirection is a violation of professional legal
standards. Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766, 770 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963).
58. See State v. Johnson, 183 N.W.2d 194 (Iowa 1971); Padgett v. State 364 S.W.2d 397
(Tex. Crim. 1963); Montgomery v. Vinzant, 297 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Ct. App. 1956).
59. See Burrus v. Silhavy, 155 Ind. App. 558, 293 N.E.2d 794 (1973).
60. Osborn v. Lake Wash. School Dist., 1 Wash. App. 534,462 P.2d 966 (1969); State v.
Smith, 189 Wash. App. 534, 65 P.2d 1975 (1937).
61. Lapasinkas v. Quick, 17 Mich. App. 733, 170 N.W.2d 318 (1969).
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object inobtrusively. 6 2 Counsel could, for example, approach the
6
bench and object on the record but out of the hearing of the jury. 3
Advantages of the Motion
The advantages of the motion in limine can be stated succinctly:
its effect is to "shorten the trial, simplify the issues and reduce the
possibilities of a mistrial." 64 The prime advantage of the motion was
mentioned earlier. Use of the motion may avoid reversible error by
isolating the jury from prejudice and replacing the unrealistic
admonition to the jury to disregard prejudicial statements. 6 s If the
motion is presented before trial with a brief the trial judge will also
be given the time to study the contested material outside the hurried
atmosphere of the courtroom. 6 6 Finally, like the pretrial conference
and other pretrial devices, the motion may save overall trial time by
reducing the number of collateral issues in the case and preventing
long delays and interruptions at trial over questions of admissibility.
"Thus, during trial both judge and jury are able to concentrate upon
'6 7
the main dispute."
The New Mexico Version of the Motion
The court of appeals' handling of the two issues raised by the
motion in limine granted in Proper v. Mowry is consistent with the
cases in other jurisdictions. First, the court cited the two common
sources of authority for the motion in limine.6 8 As the motion in
Proper was made before trial, it probably would have been sufficient
9
for the court to state that the pretrial procedure in Rule 16(6)6 of
the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure covers the motion in
limine. However, the court seemed to be desirious of emphasizing
that it was adopting a broad definition of the motion. It stated that
the motion is a written request "which is usually made before or
after the beginning of a jury trial for a protective order against prejudicial questions and statements." 7 The court also expressly held
62. Osborn v. Lake Wash. School Dist., 1 Wash. App. 534, -, 462 P.2d 966, 969
(1969).
63. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 42, at 633.
64. Burrus v. Silhavy, 155 Ind. App., 588, -, 293 N.E.2d 794, 795 (1973).
65. Id.
66. Id.; Comment, Motion in Limine, supra note 17, at 218.
67. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 42, at 634. See also Wallin v. Kinyon Estate, 164
Mont. 160, 519 P.2d 1236, 1238 (1974).
68. 90 N.M. at 713, 715, 568 P.2d at 239, 241.
69. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(16)(6) (Repl. 1970).
70. 90 N.M. at 714, 568 P.2d at 240 (quoting Burrus v. Silhavy, 155 Ind. App. 588, 293
N.E.2d 794 (1974), (emphasis added and that of the court omitted).
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that the inherent power of the court to admit or exclude evidence
authorized the trial court's granting of the motion in Proper.7'1 As
was indicated earlier, other authorities believe that the inherent
determine
power theory empowers the court to hear and
7
2
trial.
the
of
start
the
after
even
made
limine
in
motions
The court disposed of the second issue of whether it was error for
the trial judge to partially deny the plaintiff's motion by applying
the general rule that the denial of a motion in limine is not reversible
error. Under the general rule error is not predicated on the denial of
the motion but on the actual mention at trial of the things complained of in the motion. An objection at the time the prejudicial
matters are referred to at trial is necessary to preserve the record for
appellate review. 73 After it stated the general rule,7 4 the Proper
court properly reframed the issue: it looked at the questionable
matters that were touched on in the defendant's opening statement
to see if they were actually prejudicial and inadmissible under the
rules of evidence. 7 s
The Proper opinion contains a miscellany of dicta. Since the court
anticipated that motions in limine would be "filled hereafter in many
cases," it believed that it was necessary "to tour the subject matter
and establish guidelines." 7 6 It said, for example, that the wording of
the motion should point out the objectionable matters with
specificity and state why they are believed to be prejudicial. 7 1 The
court also stated that the trial court has the right to take a motion in
limine under advisement, reserving the right to rule upon the issue of
admissibility when it arises at trial.7 8 Since taking the motion under
advisement has the same immediate effect as the outright denial of
the motion, this view is consistent with the rule that the denial of a
motion in limine is not reversible error. Finally, the court warned
that an attorney's violation of an order granting a motion in limine
by direct reference to excluded matters or insinuation would be a
violation of professional legal standards and the attorney's duty to
the court. 7 9
It is unclear whether the Proper court disapproved, as so many
other courts have, of the use of prohibitive orders in the absolute
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 715, 568 P.2d at 241.
See text accompanying notes 33-41, supra.
See text accompanying notes 52-53, supra.
90 N.M. at 715, 568 P.2d at 241.
Id at 715-16, 568 P.2d at 241-42.
Id. at 714, 568 P.2d at 240.
Id.
Id. at 715, 568 P.2d at 241.
Id (quoting Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766, 770 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963)).
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form to grant motions in limine. At one point the court stated that
the order "should provide and advise counsel such ruling is without
prejudice to the right to offer proof during the course of the trial, in
the jury's absence, of those matters covered in the motion." 8 0 On
the other hand, in its consideration of the reversible error issue the
court spoke of orders "absolutely prohibitive in nature" 8 1 without
discussing whether they were giving approbation to such orders.
CONCLUSION
New Mexico has joined the steadily growing number of jurisdictions that recognize the motion in limine. In so doing it has
provided the attorney with a valuable tool for preventing the jury
from being influenced by prejudicial matters. In many cases it will
increase the chances that the parties to a case will get a fair, errorfree trial. However, overuse of the motion should be avoided. It
should be used only when essential to exclude highly inflammatory
matter.8 2 If used to exclude minor matters the motion could come
into judicial disfavor.
CAROL BACA

80. Id (quoting Twyford v. Weber, 220 N.W.2d 919, 923 (Iowa 1974)).
81. 90 N.M. at 715, 568 P.2d at 241.
82. See Lewis v. Buena Vista Ins. Ass'n, 183 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1971).

